"How do CTAs' Return Distribution Characteristics affect their likelihood
of Survival?"
I. Introduction
The issue of whether fund performance can be predicted has been an issue of intense academic and industry research. Most academic evidence on this issue tends to point out that performance is not predictable (for evidence on mutual funds see Malkiel, 1995 and references therein) . A reflection of these findings is the statement on disclosure documents that past performance is not indicative of future performance.
One issue that has not received as much attention in the Managed Futures Industry is the question of survival. By survival we mean the ability of a program or a Commodity
Trading Advisor (CTA) to stay in business. Why is this issue important? First, ignoring survivorship biases can substantially affect reported industry benchmark returns. Second, survivorship biases will tend to generate the appearance of predictability of returns.
Third, the chances of survival in different industries (Managed Futures vs. Mutual Funds for example) may be markedly different rendering absolute return comparisons suspect.
Fourth, programs that fail to survive may systematically exhibit undesirable performance characteristics. Finally, survival experience may be explained by the program's return characteristics making its study extremely important if one wants to increase the performance of a pool vehicle. If survival experience can be explained and predicted.
one could potentially select programs based on their likelihood of survival and by doing so increase the future performance of the program or pool. This is in contrast to pure diversification which, in the presence survivorship problems will likely reduce returns and increase volatility.
The objective of this study is to provide some answers to these questions. The specific questions that we want to address are:
• What are the overall chances of survival in managed futures and how do they compare with the mutual fund industry?
• Do programs that survive over time have more desirable performance characteristics than those who do not? • How do surviving programs differ from their unsuccessful counterparts in their return distribution characteristics that are associated with the program's returns mathematical expectation and its money management? We shall refer to these components as the 'edge' component and the 'money management' component respectively.
• Are common program's classifications (diversified vs. non-diversified, systematic vs. discretionary) useful in discriminating between performance and survival characteristics?
• Can a program chances of survival be reasonably predicted?
II. Data
To find answers to these questions we studied 925 programs between 1975 and June 1995. The data used was provided by the Barclay Trading Group, Ltd. and represents one of the most comprehensive managed futures databases. Of the 925 programs, 490
were still in business as of June, 1995. The 'edge' of a program was proxied by seven different and complementary measures. The first one is the annualized monthly compounded rate of return (AMCRR) over the life of the program. This measures the level of returns that the program has been able to yield over its life. To give an idea of the range of returns that one can find among different programs over their lives, the maximum AMCRR was 226.4% and the minimum AMCRR was -52.7%. The second measure of the edge was the return on the most successful month. This measure focuses on the magnitude of potential gains and gives an idea of the magnitude of the program's edge and whether the program is trading at optimal levels. The program with the most successful month had a return of 319% while the program with the smallest most successful month had a return of 0.8%. The third measure used was the Sharpe ratio. This is a measure of returns over and above the treasury bill rate per unit of standard deviation. It is useful to compare returns from programs with very different 'risk' characteristics. Suppose you have two programs A and B that have the same monthly compounded return, but program A has a Sharpe ratio that is two times as large as that of program B. This means that program A can generate the same returns as program B but with half the risk or volatility. The next two measures of the edge, skewness and kurtosis, are rather technical and measures how capable a program is to generate larger returns with a high degree of probability. The percentage of winning months provides an indication of the type of trading system that the program is using. As will be shown later in the paper low percentages are often associated with long-term trend following programs, and higher percentages are associated with very short-term arbitrage type strategies. Finally, the average monthly winning return helps us understand how profitable winning trades are. Short-term trading approaches have much lower average winning months than long term trading approaches. The quality of the program's money management was proxied by seven different measures. The first one was the standard deviation of monthly returns. The standard deviation gives an idea of the probability of large positive returns or drawdowns relative to the program's average monthly return. Take for example a program with a monthly standard deviation of 8%, and an average monthly return of 3%. Since 95.44% of all the possible monthly returns should be within plus/minus two standard deviations of the mean of the program 2 , one is equally likely to see maximum drawdowns of 13% (3% -2x8%) and large positive returns of 19% (3% + 2x8%). The second measure of money management was the maximum monthly drawdown. This measure focuses on the magnitude of potential losses and gives an idea of both risk controls and whether the program is trading at optimal levels. To give a better idea of the magnitude of drawdowns found, the largest drawdown was 81%, while the smallest drawdown was no drawdown at all. The average monthly drawdown for all programs studied was 16%.
Although looking at any single monthly drawdown is important, perhaps even more important is the amount of time that it takes a program to come out of a loss. For example, suppose that a program's initial equity is $1,000,000 and that in the next month the program experiences a 25% drawdown, reducing its equity to $750,000. What is the maximum number of months that would take the program to bring the equity back to Table 3 and descriptive statistics are contained in Table 4 . Table 1 Measures of the 'Edge' of a Program
Annualized Monthly Compounded Return
Bottom line performance of a program or trader.
Maximum Monthly Return
Return on the most successful month. Proxy for the program's return potential and whether it is trading at optimal levels.
Annual Sharpe Ratio
Measure of returns per unit of standard deviation. Allows one to compare returns of programs with different volatility.
Skewness of Monthly Returns
A positive number tells that the program has a tendency to generate returns higher than the mean more often than normal.
Kurtosis of Monthly Returns
Measures how returns are packed around the mean relative to a normal distribution. A positive number tells that there is higher probability of finding returns near the mean compared to a normal distribution.
Average monthly winning return %
Measures the average monthly return calculated with all the winning months.
Percentage of winning months
Measures the percentage of all trading months that were profitable. Consistency with which programs achieve their returns. Gives an idea of what kind of drawdowns and large returns to expect.
Maximum Monthly Drawdown
Magnitude of potential loses. Gives an idea of risk controls and whether the program trades at optimal levels or not.
Months to Recover from Worst Drawdown
Other things equal, programs with good money management will recover quicker than programs with poor money management.
Standard Deviation of Times to Recover from Drawdown
Measures the consistency with which programs come out of drawdowns.
Time to Recover from Worst Drawdown as a percent of the Program's Life
Gives an idea of how much of a program's business life is spent recovering from the worst drawdown.
Reported margin to equity ratio
Measures the leverage reported by the CTA or program.
Average losing monthly return
Measures the average monthly loss calculated using only the losing months. Malkiel, B. (1995) .
The question then becomes: If an investor chooses portfolios randomly, without consideration of survival issues, how much is he expected to lose from including programs that will not survive in his portfolio? To answer this question we need to know the expected difference in returns between portfolios of surviving and non-surviving programs. Tables 6 and 7 attempt to provide answers to this question. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 On average, the return difference between surviving and non-surviving mutual funds has been around 6% per year for the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . This difference has been very uniform across that time period. In the managed futures industry the average return difference between surviving and non-surviving programs has been in the order of 9%.
We can calculate the expected reduction in performance from randomly selecting programs using the following methodology.
Let's define n = the number of programs in a portfolio. P = the probability of choosing a program that will survive.
= the probability of choosing k surviving programs in a portfolio that contains n programs.
( )
is the relative performance of a portfolio that contains k surviving programs and n-k non-surviving programs.
-R (k n
)is the performance reduction relative to a portfolio of survivors.
For example if we have a portfolio composed of 2 programs (n=2) and we happened to choose programs that will survive, then Then the expected reduction in performance in a 10 program portfolio using an average mortality rate of 46.7% would be equal to:
If we increase the mortality rate to a rate of 52.6% then the expected reduction in performance is 4.7%. In contrast the same analysis for the mutual fund industry reveals a performance reduction of only 0.88%. This fact alone highlights the importance of considering survival characteristics in the selection of managed futures programs.
Ignoring survival characteristics is expected to cost investors an average of 4.2 to 4.7%
per year.
III.B. Surviving vs. Non-surviving Programs: How different are they?
Let's now turn to the second question: Do programs that survive over time have more desirable performance characteristics than those who do not ? We have already shown that in randomly selected portfolios ignoring survival chances can have very important adverse effects on annual returns. The results of the study show that the whole return distribution characteristics of surviving and non-surviving programs is different. The results of the comparison of the 'edge' variables are presented in Table 8 . Several patterns stand out from the results in Table 8 . Programs that have survived over time have been able to yield annualized monthly compounded returns that are on average 33% higher than unsuccessful programs. This difference is statistically as well as economically significant. More importantly. not only were surviving programs able to generate larger returns for their clients but they did so with lower risk. The average annual Sharpe ratio for surviving programs was 96% larger than the one for unsuccessful programs. This difference was also statistically significant. Surviving programs have also tended to generate returns that are not as tightly packed around the mean compared to unsuccessful ones as shown by the higher average kurtosis of their return distribution.
The average maximum monthly return that both types of programs have been able to generate over time has been the same. Finally, the average monthly winning return, and the percentage of winning months is statistically the same for both surviving and nonsurviving programs.
Clearly, the performance of surviving programs measured by their 'edge' variables has been better than their non-surviving counterparts. These results were calculated for all surviving and non-surviving programs from 1975 to 1995. The corollary of this finding is that if one were able to select programs based on their chances of survival one could improve the 'edge' characteristics of the resulting selection. That means that if we were to select programs based on their chances of survival, we would improve not only the absolute returns of the program but its return/risk tradeoff. What most performance studies have done is to select programs with better past 'edge' characteristics or performance. Unfortunately, this criterion does not guarantee the selection of programs with the highest chances of survival. As an example, the annualized monthly compounded return of the 90 th percentile in the non-surviving group was 37.20%! To put it in a nutshell: survival will guarantee better performance BUT better performance does not guarantee survival!
An important observation at this point is that the large performance differences cannot be explained by the percentage of winning months and the average monthly winning return.
Why is this important? The percentage of winning months is highly associated with the type of trader and/or trading system. The average monthly win gives you an idea of how much profit traders can extract from a profitable trade. Short-term traders have lower average wins; medium to long term traders will have the largest average wins. Within each category there is considerable variation. Table 9 contains the averages for the percentage of winning months, the average monthly wins and losses for different types of traders. As expected 'Arbitrage' traders have the highest percent of winning months and the lowest average monthly wins. Systematic traders are defined by Barclay as traders where 95% or more of the decision making process is systematized and are very often 'trend following' traders. The average percentage of monthly wins is the lowest of all categories since they are typically medium to long term traders. 'Turtles' are known to be systematic (trend following) traders. The last row in Table 9 contains the average numbers for 'Turtles' that are classified as systematic traders by Barclay. Clearly, their percentage of winning months is not substantially different than the average systematic trader indicating that these Turtles may not have above average skills for picking profitable trades. The win/loss ratio suggests that the source of their performance is likely to be the dynamic use of leverage and leverage based money management.
Since on average surviving and non-surviving traders do not differ in their percentage of monthly wins and average monthly winning return, a large proportion of their differences could potentially be explained by their money management. No significant differences in the use of (reported) leverage was detected between both types of CTAs or programs 4 . Unsuccessful programs have spent a larger proportion of their business life recovering from their worst drawdown. A very important difference between surviving and non-surviving programs is in their average losing monthly returns.
The average losing monthly return for the surviving programs was -4.60%. Programs that did not survive had an average losing monthly return of -5.33%. This difference is not only statistically significant but economically very large. In fact, this difference can account for a large proportion of the differences between surviving and non-surviving programs. Why? Suppose for the moment that the monthly return process of any arbitrary fund or CTA can be approximately modeled by the following binomial process:
4 Reported leverage in terms of margin to equity is a very poor proxy for actual leverage. Two programs that report the same margin to equity could have very different leverage levels.
where:
is the expected return on the fund in the next month. R t+1 = ln(Vami t+1 /Vami t ).
P:
is the probability that the fund will have a winning month.
w : is the average return on winning months.
l : is the average return on losing months.
is the variance of monthly returns.
If this is a reasonable description of any fund or CTA's return generating process, then the annual expected return and the variance of annual returns can be calculated using the following formulae:
We assume that reasonable estimates of p w l , , can be obtained with the historical data for any fund or CTA. In comparing surviving and non-surviving programs we shall use the estimates in Tables 8 and 10 . Since equation (1) estimates the expected monthly return, it can also be used to estimate the expected amount of time that it would take a program or CTA to recover from a given drawdown. The expected time to recover ( ) ttr from a given drawdown DD would be: The results in Table 11 demonstrate that the assumption of a binomial process for CTAs' returns is consistent with the actual relative performance between survivors and nonsurvivors:
1. Annual returns on surviving programs are expected to be 14% greater than returns on their non-surviving counterparts.
2. Surviving programs are expected to be 7% less volatile than their non-surviving counterparts.
3. The Sharpe ratio of surviving programs is expected to be 26% larger than for non-surviving programs.
4. Surviving programs are expected to recover from drawdowns in 73% of the time that it takes non-surviving programs.
These differences are very consistent with the actual differences between surviving and non-surviving programs and suggest that the binomial assumption may be a reasonable one. Further, these results suggest that the binomial model could be used to investigate other relative performance issues like: the effect of leverage on a program's performance results, specific differences between discretionary and systematic traders, sources of performance among different trading systems, etc.
III.C. Using the Binomial Model to understand the Source of Performance Differences
The binomial model can also be used to understand the sources of performance between different type of traders. Table 9 Table 12 illustrates the output of the binomial model. Annual returns for the systematic Turtle are expected to be around double the returns of a systematic trader. These returns are expected to be achieved with only 34% more volatility. The expected Sharpe ratio of a systematic Turtle is almost double that of a typical systematic trader, and they are expected to recover from a 20% drawdown in half the time it takes an average systematic trader. 
5.18%
). This reduction will likely be achieved less with money stops and more through de-leveraging during drawdown periods. This dynamic use of leverage will likely reduce the overall leverage level and achieve the loss control result. The results of performing this exercise using the binomial model (replacing -5.18% with -4.40% and lowering the leverage amount to 1.6x) are shown in Table 12 under the heading '1.6x Avg.
Systematic'. The results in Table 12 confirm the hypothesis that the right combination of leverage and loss control can transform the typical systematic trader into a systematic Turtle.
III.D. Performance and Survival of Diversified vs. Non-Diversified Programs
In this section of the paper we examine the issue of performance and survival as it is related to the type of program or CTA. Specifically we compare performance and survival experience between diversified and non-diversified (specialists) programs. The objective of the comparison is to provide some factual information on the relationship (if any) between reported diversification, performance and survival experience. Table 13 contains the results of a comparison between diversified and non-diversified programs.
The results contained in Table 13 Interestingly, the conclusions drawn from these results are identical to those drawn from the results in Table 13 . In both samples, diversified programs have substantially higher volatility than non-diversified programs. This higher volatility is largely attributable to the lower percentage of monthly wins and higher average win/loss spread for these programs. The relatively low average percentage of winning months of 57% suggests that the proportion of systematic traders in this category may be high. Figure 1 contains the breakdown of the diversified sample into systematic, discretionary and other programs. 
III.E. Performance and Survival of Systematic vs. Discretionary Programs
The results presented in the previous section suggest that it may be the type of trading system and not the degree of diversification what may discriminate among programs' performance and survival characteristics. With this idea in mind we classified programs or CTAs into systematic and discretionary and we compared the average 'edge' and money management variables as well as the mortality rate in each category. The results of this comparison are contained in Table 15 . Several distinctive results emerge from the results in Table 15 . First, Discretionary programs have had higher mortality rates than their systematic counterparts. The mortality rate for discretionary programs is 45.5% while it is only 36.8% for Systematic programs. Second, the variability in the performance of Discretionary programs has been much larger than that found for Systematic traders even though the average program standard deviation 5 has been comparable to that found in Systematic programs. The standard deviation of the annual compounded return for Diversified traders was 20% as opposed to only 15% for systematic traders. 6 This difference accounts for the fact that, statistically speaking, discretionary programs have not yielded larger compounded returns than systematic programs. The previous two results suggest that in practice it may be more difficult to select discretionary traders than systematic traders. Systematic traders or programs appear to be more homogeneous than discretionary ones.
5 These are the numbers in Tables 13-16 . 6 These statistics should not be confused with the 'Average Standard Deviation of Returns' in Tables 13-16 . The numbers in the Tables measure the average volatility of a program, while the standard deviation of the annual compounded return measures the variability of yields for a particular group of programs.
We conducted the same analysis on programs that had track records greater than three years to avoid the potential criticism that programs with short track records might bias the analysis. The results of such analysis are contained in Table 16 . The conclusions from the previous analysis are not changed by reducing the sample to only those programs that have track records of more than three years.
III.F. Summary of Findings on Program Classification
The results presented so far suggest that:
a. Programs classified as diversified did not have any less volatility than those that were classified as non-diversified. In fact, diversified programs had on average greater volatility than those classified as non-diversified. This difference was statistically significant and economically meaningful. 
III.G. Predicting Survival
The results presented so far clearly show that there are important differences between surviving and non-surviving programs. They show that if one were able to discriminate between programs with good chances of survival and programs with poor chances of survival, the overall performance of a pool could be improved. In contrast, the usual classification of traders and/or programs into Diversified vs. Non-diversified, or Tables 8 and 10 or Tables 13 to 16 Table 17 . The construction of a survival model had several objectives. First, we wanted to identify which variables affect the probability of survival. Second, we wanted to know how well survival experience could be explained with a survival model. Finally, we wanted to know whether survival is a predictable characteristic. Since the estimation of a reliable model of survival behavior requires a substantial amount of data we divided the entire Barclay database into two sub-samples.
The first sub-sample was used for estimation and the second for validation and testing of predictability. The model was estimated on data for programs that traded between January 1975 and December 1992. This sub-sample contains data on programs that started trading at different times up to December 1991; thus only programs with one year or more of trading experience were included. 7 This sub-sample contained 665 programs of which only 519 were in business at the end of 1992. Table 17 also contains information about whether each variable had a statistical relationship with survival experience. The annualized monthly compounded return did not have a significant relationship with survival experience. This finding is consistent with the general rule that says that survival is related to performance but performance may not be related to survival. The maximum monthly return achieved by a program or trader, its Sharpe ratio, and the average monthly winning return are found to have positive impact 7 We included programs with less of a three years track record based on the results in Section 5 that suggest that this population is very unlikely to bias the results. * P-value is that probability of drawing the obtained coefficient from a distribution with zero expected value. **The coefficient on these dummies is relative to discretionary programs. *** The coefficient on this dummy is relative to non-diversified programs.
on the program's probability of survival. Management fees are negatively related to survival, but incentive fees are positively related to survival experience. The standard deviation of monthly returns, the maximum monthly drawdown, and the maximum time to recover from a drawdown as a percentage of a program's life are all negatively related to a program's chances of survival. The type of trader or program has an effect on survival as evidenced by significant coefficients for systematic traders and Other traders.
Systematic traders are found to have greater probability of survival than discretionary traders. 'Other' 8 traders are found to have lower probability of survival than discretionary traders. Arbitrage traders have comparable survival probability to discretionary traders. Finally, as expected from the previous section's descriptive analysis, Diversified traders were found to have not significantly different survival experience than non-diversified ones.
The results of the model estimation were used to construct a survival index. This index was used to rank programs by their chances of survival into three categories: low, medium, and high chances of future survival. To gain an appreciation of how well the model explained 'in sample' survival experience, we ranked the non-survivors based on their survival index. The results of this classification are contained in Table 18 . Seventy percent of the non-survivors came from the Low survival rank. When we add the number of programs in the Low and Medium survival ranks we were able to account for ninety three percent of the non surviving programs. These results clearly demonstrate that the model was quite successful in discriminating between the survivors and non-survivors.
A more relevant question from the practical point of view is whether we can rely on survival rankings to forecast future survival experience. With this question in mind we ranked all programs that were trading on December 1992 based on their survival indices.
We then followed these programs through December 1995 and kept track of the number of programs that did not survive together with the rank they came from. If the rankings had no predictive power we would expect that on average, only thirty three percent of the non survivors would come from each of the survival ranks. If on the other hand, the rankings had predicting power, we would expect the largest percentage of non-survivors coming from the Low rank and the lowest percentage of non-survivors from the High rank. The results in Table 19 demonstrate that the survival rankings have predictive power. Eighty three percent of the programs that did not survive came from the Low and Medium survival ranks. Only seventeen percent of the non-survivors came from the High survival rank. Table 20 show that the results of this study do not contain this bias. If anything, the bias would be towards finding more non-survivors in the High category since there are slightly more programs in this category relative to the other two. Table 20 also contains the actual mortality rates in each of the groups from Jan-93 to Dec-95. If the survival rankings had predictive power, one would expect to find the highest mortality rates in the low group and the smallest mortality rates in the high group. The results in Table 20 further demonstrate that the survival rankings had predictive power. The highest mortality rate was experienced in the Low group (38%) followed by the medium group (35%) and the high group (14%). Notice that the high group experienced mortality rates that are less than half the size of the other two groups and comparable to the mortality rates experienced in the Mutual Fund industry as show in Table 5 .
IV. Summary
This article demonstrates the importance of considering survival issues when selecting managed futures programs. Mortality in managed futures has been historically very high relative to mortality in the mutual fund industry. Ignoring survival issues in the selection of managed futures programs is likely to translate into reduced performance of the final program. The empirical evidence suggests that survival is associated with performance but that performance is not necessarily associated with survival.
We develop a simple model to understand the sources of performance in managed futures. Results from the binomial model are consistent with observed results, suggesting that this model could be used to compare the potential performance of different programs as well as to understand the sources of performance of a program or trader.
We find that the classification of programs into 'Diversified' and 'Non-Diversified' does not provide any useful information regarding the likelihood of survival. Surprisingly, 'Diversified' programs are significantly more volatile than 'Non-Diversified' without any corresponding larger returns. The classification of programs and/or traders into 'Systematic' and 'Discretionary' is found to be associated with their likelihood of survival. Systematic programs/traders are found to have higher chances of survival that Discretionary ones.
We show that a model of survival behavior can explain a substantial proportion of past survival experience as well as future survival experience. Return distribution characteristics associated with the 'edge' of a program and its money management can have important effects on future survival and performance. The finding that survival experience can be reasonably explained and forecasted has important practical implications for the formation of managed futures portfolios.
